Radio and Civic Courage in the Communications Circuit of John Hersey’s “Hiroshima”

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Radio played a critical role in expanding the readership and amplifying the messages of John Hersey’s “Hiroshima,” a landmark work of literary journalism published in 1946.

On August 6, 1945, many Americans first learned of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima from their radios. That radio was a ubiquitous mass medium during the 1940s, both in and out of wartime, is beyond dispute. But what is little known is that radio introduced many Americans to the graphic human details of the atomic destruction a little more than a year later when John Hersey’s iconic “Hiroshima” was published in the New Yorker the final week of August in 1946. Radio news announcers and commentators widely discussed Hersey’s story on the air as soon as it appeared on newsstands, and within weeks the American Broadcasting Company aired a reading of the story across four successive evenings. Radio thus played a critical role in amplifying the messages of Hersey’s article and expanding its audience and readership by millions.

This study seeks to recover that history. Doing so is important for three reasons. First, it contributes to our understanding of the remarkable success of a work of journalism and literature that has been characterized, at least in one highly regarded quarter, as the most important work of American journalism in the twentieth century. Second, and more far-reaching, the history of radio’s role in drawing attention to “Hiroshima” enhances our un-
derstanding of how Americans reoriented themselves to a radically altered world because of that bombing, one in which Cold War politics and social sensibility were dominated by anxiety about nuclear holocaust. Third, there is a lesson to learn from the civic courage the New Yorker and the broadcast media demonstrated in publicizing a work that put a human face on the terrible destruction at Hiroshima.

In recovering the history, this study will review the existing literature and examine the role of radio in the context of the communications circuit of “Hiroshima.” It will also explore the public interest requirements of broadcast during the era; provide the backdrop for the civic courage displayed by the New Yorker in publishing the article; and examine how the broadcast media built on that civic courage in publicly discussing the work. These events, it should be emphasized, took place during a time when the U.S. government attempted to limit, control, and shape the information that reached the American public about the atomic bomb and Hiroshima. Perhaps most important, these historical events produced consequences with which we still deal today.

**Scholars, “Hiroshima,” and the Communications Circuit**

Scholars have written a great deal about “Hiroshima” across the years. Literary scholars have explored it as a seminal work of American literary non-fiction; journalism historians have documented Hersey’s reporting strategies and his work with New Yorker editors to develop and revise the story for rapid publication; and literary journalism scholars have discussed the literary and narrative elements of Hersey’s report. The publication history of “Hiroshima” has previously been told, but usually as a brief background narrative in works with other primary concerns. Two historical studies have addressed the publication of “Hiroshima” as a primary topic. Michael Yavenditti explored the reception of Hersey’s literary reportage when it first appeared, focusing on the reactions of particular print journalists, public officials, and readers with little mention of the role radio played in the reception. The most recent publication history explores how Hersey, the New Yorker editors, Alfred A. Knopf and his publishing house, and other individuals and institutions involved in the publication and republication of “Hiroshima” largely disregarded profit concerns in order to better serve the public interest. As we will see, radio was one of these institutions.

What has been missing is a fuller examination of the role of radio broadcasting in disseminating and commenting on the article and subsequent book. In exploring the issue, this article uses documents from the New Yorker records at the New York Public Library and the John Hersey papers at the Beinecke Library at Yale University.
Within a larger critical context, this article examines radio as one aspect of Robert Darnton’s communications circuit. It is true that some scholars of the history of print culture have criticized Darnton’s circuit metaphor as privileging the author and “the idea of communication” while neglecting or marginalizing the work of other social actors “who were less interested in the meaning” of a cultural product and more interested in their own particular social, economic, cultural, or ideological concerns. While this critique is valid in many historical instances dealing solely with print culture, the circumstances regarding “Hiroshima” are different because the information and ideas the text communicated—and the public conversation this information engendered—shaped the concerns and actions of social actors in the communications network. One of the social actors was the medium of radio. Darnton’s model of the communications circuit, developed to explore the social workings of texts in periods and societies before the advent of electronic and digital communications, must be updated if book historians are to account adequately for the “life cycle” of a printed text when electronic media emerged in the twentieth century. In 1946, the relatively new medium of radio became an important part of the life cycle of “Hiroshima” in America.

**American Radio and Regulation:**

**Public Interest and Civic Courage**

During the early 1930s American radio emphasized entertainment and paid little attention to public affairs. But major events, such as the kidnapping of the Lindbergh baby in 1932 and Hitler’s annexation of Austria in 1938, proved radio’s potential as a news medium. Radio executives began to relax an initial hesitancy about devoting airtime to news as it became clear that radio’s immediacy provided radio news a competitive edge over newspapers.

A related issue arose regarding social responsibility for broadcasters using airwaves owned by the public. The Federal Communication Commission was late to adopt New Deal reformist attitudes. But the situation changed in the 1940s due to the appointment of new regulators and growing public concerns about the supposed tendency of commercial radio to ignore those issues. Critics on the left condemned radio news for its general neglect of the public interest and the power that advertisers wielded in shaping news. A newly progressive FCC issued the *Blue Book* in March of 1946, a policy document that mandated the public interest obligations of commercial broadcasters. Among other things, the report required that to retain their licenses broadcasters must sustain innovative programs in the public interest that could not attract commercial sponsorship. The *Blue Book* was meant to institute a substantive reform of commercial media. When he read the finished draft, the chairman
of the FCC penned a comment reflecting, in its own way, how the world was reorienting itself to the nuclear age. “I know now,” he wrote to an FCC staff member, “how Truman felt when they told him he had an atom bomb.” Not surprisingly, broadcasters fought back, accusing certain FCC members of being in league with communist infiltrators, and the Blue Book initiative was effectively destroyed by 1948.

Hersey’s report on the atomic bombing of Hiroshima was published during the years when the Blue Book was in effect, and American radio producers and commentators seized the opportunity “Hiroshima” provided to serve the public interest. Indisputably, there was drama to the story which made it attractive as news. This was not a public interest story on how to grow radishes for better health. Nonetheless, it was the call for more social responsibility in the public interest that motivated radio’s coverage of Hersey’s article.

First Amendment theorist Vincent Blasi has famously highlighted the central role of civic courage as a foundational principle in First Amendment jurisprudence, particularly in the arena of free expression. In an article published in 1988, he focused on Justice Louis Brandeis’s influential opinion in the 1927 U.S. Supreme Court case Whitney v. California. Brandeis wrote of the vital role courageous speech, inspired by civic commitment, played in the robust public debate and discussion necessary to the sustenance of democracy. In Brandeis’s view, the pursuit of truth demanded civic courage, and the First Amendment was meant to protect the right to publish and speak on controversial matters that often required substantial courage in the face of the “occasional tyrannies of governing majorities.” The revolutionary founders of the country “valued liberty both as an end and as a means,” Brandeis wrote. “They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty.”

It is Justice Brandeis’s view of the First Amendment that shaped and informed the public interest standard in government regulation of the public airwaves from the 1927 Radio Act forward. That was reconfirmed when a 1998 presidential commission study of the public interest obligations of digital television providers stated that broadcast regulation in the public interest has sought, from the very beginning, “to meet certain basic needs of American politics and culture, over and above what the marketplace may or may not provide. It has sought to cultivate a more informed citizenry, greater democratic dialogue, diversity of expression, a more educated population, and more robust, culturally inclusive communities.”

Those who participated in the writing, publication, and circulation of “Hiroshima” in 1946—including players in both broadcast and print media—were engaging in courageous expression that gave the American public
critical new information and fueled public discussion about the atomic bomb and its use in Japan. They did so in a climate of repression and uncertainty with an abiding faith that the First Amendment protected their expression. During the war, the U.S. Office of Censorship had asked all print and broadcast news outlets not to publish any information about atomic science or secret weapons but rescinded the request after the bombing of Hiroshima.\textsuperscript{19} After the war, the reports and photographs of American journalists covering the “employment” of the bomb “remained under strict review,” according to Hiroshima historians Robert Lifton and Greg Mitchell.\textsuperscript{20} In September of 1945, President Harry S. Truman sent a confidential request to American editors and broadcasters asking them not to publish information about the atomic bomb, including its employment and effects, without consulting with the War Department.\textsuperscript{21} Just days before the New Yorker published Hersey’s report, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was signed into law. Among other things, the act restricted the dissemination of information about atomic energy, exacting a criminal penalty for violations.\textsuperscript{22} General Douglas MacArthur, who oversaw the occupation of Japan, tightly controlled the movement of information—including information about the destruction at Hiroshima and Nagasaki—from Japan to the United States.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, when magazine and newspaper editors and radio news producers and commentators published, republished, and discussed Hersey’s report, they were exercising significant civic courage in the face of governmental efforts to control and censor information about the atomic bomb and conditions on the ground in Japan.

Given these largely successful attempts by the U.S. government to limit public access to information about what Albert Einstein called the “apalling effect on human beings” of one fairly primitive atomic bomb, it is not surprising that people across America wanted to learn more about what had happened, and was continuing to happen, in Hiroshima.\textsuperscript{24} When the New Yorker published “Hiroshima” one year after the bombings, Americans had already learned some basics about atomic science from coverage in magazines, newspapers, and radio broadcasts.\textsuperscript{25} This public coverage and discussion produced what historian Paul Boyer described as an “intense fear and a somewhat unfocused conviction that an urgent and decisive public response was essential.”\textsuperscript{26} The scientists’ movement, which involved many scientists who had worked on the Manhattan Project, emerged almost immediately after the bombings with the purpose of shaping public policy to avoid atomic war in the future. Some influential religious leaders publicly condemned the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, variously describing them as “mass murder,” “morally indefensible,” and a “supreme atrocity.”\textsuperscript{27} Most Americans, however, approved of their country’s use of the bombs.\textsuperscript{28} And this public opinion was
likely shaped by the U.S. government’s successful efforts in controlling the information the American public received about the effects of the bombs. For example, Americans knew little about radiation sickness and had little to no understanding of how it was affecting many in Hiroshima who had survived the bomb’s blast. Few appreciated that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not truly military targets but were home to large civilian populations. General Leslie R. Graves, who had directed the Manhattan Project, told reporters that the atomic bombs detonated above the Japanese cities produced little to no residual radioactivity on the ground. He gave this information knowing it was false.

The mass media in these early years of atomic awareness in America shaped, reflected, and participated in the public conversation about atomic realities, atomic fears, and possible solutions to the problems atomic weaponry posed for human affairs. In this historical moment, as James Baughman has noted, “Americans did not rely disproportionately or exclusively on one medium over another” for news and information. They relied instead on all the constituent parts of a complex, interconnected media system, or, the communications circuit.

Radio had its role as part of that system. The so-called “golden age of radio” was enjoying its final years before the rise of television, a time when radio news commentary was mature and contributed richly to the country’s democratic life. An invention of the war itself, radio broadcast journalism had pushed Americans out of an isolationist perspective and led them to engage the world beyond their national borders. More than ninety percent of American households had radios during this period, and seventy-three percent of Americans relied on the radio for news. The war had encouraged Americans to develop a news-listening habit—to accompany the long-extant news-reading habit—and the increased programming for news and commentary demonstrated to the FCC that radio could indeed serve the public interest. Radio news shows garnered large audiences, often upward of fifteen to twenty million. As multiple surveys at that time suggested, most Americans also continued to read newspapers habitually. Media industries and their cultural products worked together to heighten public awareness and readership of “Hiroshima” through commentary, publicity, and republication in the weeks following its appearance in the New Yorker.

**The Story of “Hiroshima”**

To understand the significance of the civic courage of radio in publicizing “Hiroshima,” one must understand the significance of the civic courage the New Yorker demonstrated in taking on the project.
A seasoned war reporter, John Hersey traveled to Japan in May of 1946. William Shawn, an editor at the *New Yorker*, subsidized the trip. He had sent Hersey to get the story of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima from the perspective of those who had lived through it. A mere three months later, Hersey’s report appeared in the *New Yorker* as the only editorial content in the August 31 issue.

For American readers who had long been denied information about the effects of the bomb, the narrative decision to tell the story from the point of view of six survivors—from the moment the bomb detonated through the harrowing year that followed—proved revelatory. Moreover, Hersey told the survivors’ stories with little authorial moralizing or editorializing. The result was a report that humanized a wartime enemy many Americans had come to view as brutal, militaristic “Japs”—a slur so common in the era that its use was widespread in everyday conversation and even in the media.

*New Yorker* editors Harold Ross and Shawn believed “Hiroshima” was a document of contemporary and historical significance, and they published it with a note to readers asking that they “take time to consider the implications” of the “all but incredible destructive power” of the atomic bomb. On a query sheet drafted while editing the piece, Ross noted, “This will be the definitive piece [or] the classic piece on what follows a bomb dropping for some time to come.”

Yet, despite their confidence in the importance of the piece, the editors published Hersey’s report believing their actions were risky. They feared that advertisers might find the story objectionable and drop the magazine as an advertising venue. Potentially much worse, they feared that the U.S. government might object to the report’s content and initiate a criminal prosecution. Having lived through the wartime era of voluntary self-censorship called for by the Office of Censorship, and no doubt aware of the Truman directive to news editors and broadcasters to handle news reports of atomic weapons and energy with great care, Ross and Shawn were both concerned that Hersey’s report might break federal law or be susceptible to the charge of being “un-American.” Ross asked Milton Greenstein, the magazine’s in-house counsel, whether the *New Yorker* should submit the article to federal censorship. “Mr. Shawn and I don’t want to,” Ross wrote, “but we don’t know whether the law is that we shall do so.”

While wartime censorship was clearly over, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 could prove a problem for publication of “Hiroshima.” Signed by President Truman on August 2, just one day after Ross queried Greenstein, the law controlled “the dissemination of restricted data . . . to assure the common defense and security.” Legal experts have discussed at length the extraordi-
nary breadth of the act’s information control provisions. As one scholar put it, “practically all information related to nuclear weapons and nuclear energy is ‘born classified’: it is a government secret as soon as it comes into existence.” The act required that information or “restricted data” remain secret unless the government actively declared it otherwise.

Greenstein had the unenviable job of not only interpreting a new law during a moment of heightened national security concerns and secrecy about atomic technology, but also reviewing Hersey’s report for information restricted by the Atomic Energy Act. In his reading of the law, Greenstein concluded that the act did not define “data” but used the term to refer to “scientific and technical matter.” (In the years that followed, experts interpreted “data” to encompass even information compiled by journalists from public documents and official sources.) While a “few observations reported by Hersey might be called scientific,” Greenstein wrote in response to Ross, it was up to the New Yorker to determine whether Hersey’s account violated the act. In other words, the act did not create an official censor that would require prior review. If the publisher believed it “far-fetched” to consider the information in a report to contain “restricted data,” Greenstein suggested, he was free to publish it. His ultimate counsel: “I do not think there is any ‘restricted data’” in Hersey’s report. But Greenstein did not stop there. In what might have been an attempt to make clear to anyone in the federal government who might later question the magazine’s decision to publish “Hiroshima,” he summed up by noting that the New Yorker “of course” did not publish Hersey’s report “‘with intent to injure the United States.’”

The New Yorker sent press releases announcing the publication of Hersey’s report to newspapers all over New York City as well as major wire services the day before the magazine appeared on newsstands. These releases served multiple purposes: to provide professional and legal cover and to increase magazine sales by heightening public interest through publicity. On the day of publication, the magazine sold out quickly as newspaper editorials and radio news and public affairs programs publicized and discussed Hersey’s account of the bombing of Hiroshima. Within one hour, 300,000 copies disappeared from newsstands; 200,000 subscribers received their copies of the issue in the mail. At that point, the entire print run was in the hands of readers all over the country.

The controversy the New Yorker management feared never materialized, although a few isolated but powerful opinion-leaders criticized Hersey’s report for failing to confront directly what they perceived to be the immorality of the U.S. bombing—again, Hersey restrained the moralizing or editorializing inclination—and to convey adequately, at least in their eyes, the horror of
of it all. But the New Yorker’s press release stimulated enormous press interest and commentary on the article in newspapers and magazines throughout the country. Although the New Yorker reached a fairly limited readership, the readership of “Hiroshima” quickly expanded into the millions as American readers—high, middling, and low—learned about and even encountered Hersey’s reportage in print and on the airwaves. For example, as early as September 3, 1946—just a few days after the article’s publication—the director of acquisitions for the Library of Congress called “Hiroshima” one of “the notable documents of our time” and asked New Yorker editors and Hersey to consider donating the original manuscript to the national library. (The manuscript ultimately went to the Beinecke Library at Yale University, where Hersey’s papers are archived.)

Six weeks after the article appeared it was clear that it was a major journalistic and literary success. Ross went so far as to mail several copies of “Hiroshima” to Truman’s press secretary. It is unclear whether Truman himself ever read the article.

**Radio Commentary on “Hiroshima”**

Part of the journalistic and literary success of “Hiroshima” must be attributed to radio. A survey of radio commentary in five major radio markets conducted the week the article was published—New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Detroit, and New England—estimated that in the course of the week “roughly half of all U.S. stations” carried commentary on Hersey’s story. Although some of the radio spots simply reported the fact of publication and the basic topic of the story, many commented on the story’s content and meanings. The transcripts of these radio broadcasts suggest the urgency of the media response and the astonishingly wide purchase the article clearly claimed on public attention. The interpretation of any work of print culture is, of course, a social activity, and “Hiroshima” provides a fascinating case study of how readers—including radio commentators—constructed meaning within a complex web of cultural, social, and political relationships. The radio response to “Hiroshima” was overwhelmingly favorable. Only one commentator criticized Hersey’s report, and in this case it was not because he dared to write about the bombing but because the account did not convey “an overall conception of the destruction of Hiroshima.”

The earliest radio commentaries appeared the evening before the “Hiroshima” issue of the New Yorker was released on newsstands. Bill Leonard, then anchor of New York’s WABC (soon to be renamed WCBS) news program “This is New York” and later president of CBS, profiled both the New Yorker and Hersey’s reportage in a protracted comment calling attention to the magazine’s departure from its routine editorial approach.
In a well-bred way, the New Yorker has always been actively aware that life in this world and this city is more than just a mellow laugh—but in spite of many a piercing comment on the state of both union and universe—it’s remained primarily a funny magazine. A very funny magazine. There is nothing funny about this week’s magazine, however.

After describing in capsule form the story Hersey told, Leonard asked his listeners to read the story as if it were the story of their own beloved New York City:

The structure of the atom which we have finally split is hard for me to understand. The structure of human society we have also split is just as hard to understand, and maybe more important. The New Yorker has devoted its entire issue to help that understanding. Read it, and then read it again, because this is New York’s story.

This trope—the idea that New York City or some other major city in the United States might one day suffer the same fate as Hiroshima—was often repeated in the broadcast and print commentary on Hersey’s story. Hersey never made this point explicitly in his article, but his humanization of those in Hiroshima who experienced the bombing invited the comparison.

Gabriel Heatter, the wildly popular, outwardly hopeful but inwardly tormented national commentator for the Mutual Network, known for his tagline “There’s good news tonight!,” was also often called the “voice of doom” because many of his broadcasts dealt with topics of disaster and human tragedy. Yet he filled his stories with sentimental optimism; he was known for his emotionalism (he sometimes cried on air), his popular human interest stories, and a close, bordering on obsequious, relationship with his sponsors. But when he reported on “Hiroshima,” he found nothing uplifting to highlight. He merely saluted Harold Ross for devoting an entire issue of his magazine “to make certain that his readers . . . get the facts, and understand their terrible implications.” During World War II and throughout the postwar years, he had an audience of an estimated eleven to fourteen million people that ballooned to an estimated twenty million during major events. Thus it is clear that many millions listened to his “Hiroshima” report.

In Chicago, Myron (“Mike”) Wallace, a former Navy communications officer turned news reporter for WMA who would later become a celebrity journalist for the CBS television news magazine 60 Minutes, described Hersey’s reportage for area listeners as the “most exhaustive work produced on Hiroshima.” (He also noted that Hersey estimated that the bomb killed 100,000 “Japs.”)

The first radio reports on Hersey’s article tended to be exactly that: reports in the form of breaking spot news. They informed listeners that a long
news story on the bombing of Hiroshima was to be published in the New Yorker and suggested that it was important to read. More radio commentary appeared the day the “Hiroshima” issue of the New Yorker appeared on newsstands, with the tone and content becoming notably more political in nature. Many radio news announcers and analysts had been thinking and talking about atomic realities for more than a year, and discussing “Hiroshima” allowed them to consider with their listeners the social and political implications of the bomb and the moral issues of the bomb’s use. When Cecil Brown, popularly known as one of “the Murrow Boys” during the war, commented extensively on the Mutual Network about “Hiroshima,” he also took up the problem of an imminent atomic arms race. "[E]ither we do away with war or we engage in an atomic bomb race," Brown argued. An arms race would lead to nuclear annihilation “here in America and elsewhere.” Expressing the then-familiar idea that world government was the solution to atomic problems, Brown told listeners the solution was for America to invest time and resources in the United Nations to bring an end to war. Brown’s comments demonstrated the relaxing of restrictions against editorial commentary that took place in the industry after the war. Moreover, they demonstrated—and encouraged—the altering social sensibility as America began its drift into a cloud of Cold War anxiety about nuclear holocaust.

Similarly, political specialist Quincy Howe, who was widely considered one of the more intellectual news commentators, told WABC listeners that “[s]tatesmen who cannot outgrow balance-of-power politics, or think beyond the sphere of influence, will do well to consider the example that the editor of The New Yorker Magazine has just set all of us.” That example, according to Howe, was “the enterprise, the intelligence and the courage” simply to publish the article—to “cut loose from precedent”—a sentiment many in the publishing and news industries expressed directly to Ross. Howe’s references to “balance-of-power politics” and “the sphere of influence”—terms used in the hackneyed bromides of international diplomacy—were suggestive of one explanation for the U.S. decision to use the atomic bomb against Japan: the idea, adopted by revisionist historians in later years, that the bombs were used not to force an imminent Japanese surrender, as Truman had told the American people, but to demonstrate U.S. superiority and dominance of the international stage to the Soviet Union. A War Department study of strategic bombing published just months prior to the publication of “Hiroshima” had suggested that a Japanese surrender was imminent before the atomic bombings. This claim undermined the credibility of the official narrative and left observers to fill in the blanks on their own. Whether Howe intended to suggest that American leaders used the bombs against Japan as a form of atomic
diplomacy in the U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union is unclear, but at the very least he was suggesting that American leaders could no longer adopt and act on outdated notions about international relations. In Howe’s estimation, the dawn of the atomic era had rewritten the rules of foreign relations.

The day after “Hiroshima” appeared in print, radio commentary became less objective and more ideological, expressing in some cases the deeply personal reactions of the commentators and in others, as noted in the case of Cecil Brown, near messianic fervor for world government as a solution to a potential nuclear holocaust. Regarding the deeply personal, Martin Agronsky, a political analyst for ABC, reported and commented extensively on his own reaction to reading Hersey. “It’s a story that moved me,” he told listeners, “and, I’ll admit, frightened me so much that I want to report it to you as fully as I possibly can this morning.” That is exactly what he did. He described in some detail the horrors Hersey documented in his story, and he then exhorted his audience to imagine “New York, Washington, Duluth, Detroit” being hit with an atomic bomb. “At the risk of sounding like a NEW YORKER advertisement,” he finished, “I feel the most important thing I can report to anyone this morning is this. Read Mr. Hersey’s story, then think as hard as you can what you can do about it. Men can’t survive a war in which one bomb can do this to a city.”

The popular ABC political commentator H. R. Baukhage saw in Hersey’s reportage and the New Yorker’s decision to publish it “the beginning of an effort to change the course of world diplomacy. That can be done if the people of America shake off their indifference.” These were strong words from Baukhage, the one-word name he used to identify himself on air. The well-traveled, multilingual, and politically moderate broadcaster was regarded by his listeners as objective and well-informed. Regarded as a public intellectual, he was known to read widely and carefully examine both sides of a controversial issue before he would comment on it with his signature baritone. Baukhage’s warning—“if we’re indifferent [to atomic weapons], we shall perish”—carried with it the full weight of his professional credibility and integrity. And his suggestion that the New Yorker’s decision to publish “Hiroshima” was an “effort to change the course of world diplomacy” was a new and bold interpretation of the magazine’s purpose in public discussion.

Raymond Gram Swing, estimated to have thirty-seven million radio listeners around the world during the war and known for his informed commentary and distinctive speaking style, “was so horrified by the danger of nuclear bombs,” one radio historian wrote, “that he abandoned any effort to be objective.” After the U.S. bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he began devoting his Friday broadcasts to the subjects of atomic weapons and world government. In the mid-1940s, he became chairman of the board of direc-
tors for Americans United for World Government, a group that proposed a United Nations charter that would establish a delegated world agency with adequate sovereignty to enforce world peace. On Friday, August 30, 1946, Swing discussed Hersey’s “Hiroshima” on air, suggesting that it “should give great numbers a sense of having a personal stake in what is done behind the walls of the State Department and the Pentagon Building and in the conference rooms of the White House.” His comments lauded Hersey’s article for its lucidity and detail, but most of all he focused heavily on the implications of atomic warfare that the story revealed. Swing took the opportunity to warn his listeners that we are “to be governed by air-power and atomic bombs if we do not govern them.” However, his strong editorial commentary on the need for world government did not take long to attract the scorn of the American right wing. Editorial pages in the Hearst newspapers the Brooklyn Tablet, the New Leader, and Counterattack began decrying Swing as a communist, or at the very least, a communist dupe.

Similarly, Max Lerner on New York’s WOR station described the Hersey article in ominous tones. He advised his audience to consider the implications of Hersey’s narrative: “Don’t say it can’t happen here. It can. What Hersey didn’t and couldn’t do was interview the hundred thousand who died at Hiroshima.” Lerner was one of many public intellectuals who realized that America’s monopoly over atomic weapons was destined to be short-lived. A prominent journalist and scholar, Lerner’s occasional radio commentaries only added to his prominence as a popular newspaper columnist for PM and the New York Post. During the peak of his influence, his column was syndicated in more than seventy newspapers in almost every major city in the U.S. His radio comments on Hersey’s story appear to allude to the 1935 Sinclair Lewis novel It Can’t Happen Here, in which a newly elected populist American president turns dictator, overthrowing democratic processes and establishing a totalitarian, militaristic regime. The implicit comparison of Lewis’s novel with Hersey’s story suggests that just as fascism could come to America, so could the atomic bomb. In a book he published in 1949, Lerner wrote, “The bomb at Hiroshima was the bell that tolled for us all. Its message rang out clearly: world state or world doom.”

This sampling of several days’ worth of the voluminous radio commentary on “Hiroshima” demonstrates how radio served both as a powerful agent of publicity for Hersey’s report and as a spur to public conversation about the frightening problems the development of atomic science had introduced in human affairs. Doubtless, millions were exposed to the commentary. Radio commentators discussed “Hiroshima” in multiple ways and for multiple reasons. In some cases, their comments were a form of boosterism for the
profession of journalism; in lauding the courage and wisdom the *New Yorker* demonstrated in publishing Hersey’s article, they were simultaneously drawing attention to their own courage in publicly discussing the article on the airwaves. In this way, radio broadcasters joined forces with their print counterparts in the news profession to circle the wagons and provide protective cover for all should charges of anti-Americanism or improper dissemination of atomic information ensue (no such charges were made). The commentators also discussed the likelihood and problems of a global nuclear arms race, suggesting that such a race would lead to nuclear holocaust. The solution, many suggested, was world government. Some suggested that American citizens should demand that their government join forces with other nations to control nuclear power through cooperative action.

Such documented radio commentary, taken in its entirety, provides a window into a historical moment in which Americans were discussing the meanings, problems, and solutions of the new atomic weapons. During this moment, critical decisions about atomic weapons production, control, and use, international relations, and the freedom of the American press to provide atomic information to the public were being made. “Hiroshima” added new information to this critical discussion.

**“Hiroshima” Read on the Airwaves**

Broadcast coverage of “Hiroshima” did not end, however, with radio commentary. Hersey’s story was also republished in the ether, with the printed text read over the airwaves. Since the *New Yorker* issue containing the article sold out its first day on the market, the public clamored—and radio and news commentators clamored—for reprints and republication. The *New Yorker* and Hersey allowed newspapers around the United States and the world to republish “Hiroshima” in full for a nominal fee, with proceeds to go to the American Red Cross. Another far-reaching form of republication was a broadcast reading of the story over a national radio network.

The radio networks had long experimented with various types of programming tied to book publication and book reading. “NBC University of the Air,” a program of serial dramas portraying classic novels, was launched in 1944. Other contemporary radio programs, such as Mutual Network’s “A Book a Week,” presented book readings, which often condensed and serialized popular novels. “Hiroshima” could thus be used to fulfill not only an existing broadcasting need but also the public interest needs mandated by the *Blue Book*. When Robert Saudek, the director of public service programming for the American Broadcasting Company, approached the editors of the *New Yorker* with the idea of broadcasting a reading of “Hiroshima” on the radio, he was appropriating existing radio genres for a genre of print cul-
ture that radio had yet to explore: a nonfiction magazine article. Saudek was an outspoken proponent of the public interest ideal in radio broadcasting, even as he worked with the limited budget ABC could provide as an upstart radio network recently divested by NBC in a federal anti-monopoly action. “People—millions of people—must know a great deal more than they do about the needs and resources of America and the world,” he said. In addition, broadcasters need to have more “courage, both in the selection of topics and in the production techniques” they used.

Saudek arranged to broadcast half-hour readings of Hersey’s article—slightly shortened for radio with Hersey’s approval of every edit—on four successive evenings, September 9-12. Hersey, apparently familiar with radio’s typical dramatic treatment of novels, would only allow the readings if they were to be commercial free and nondramatic, with no music or sound effects in the tradition of radio soap operas of the day. Thus, it was to be minimalist in nature, setting itself off from the rest of the radio medium. ABC bore the production costs, while Hersey and the *New Yorker* allowed ABC to broadcast “without fee as a service to the people of America.”

Before the airing of the first segment, an announcer explained to listeners ABC’s purpose in broadcasting a reading of Hersey’s article: “This chronicle of suffering and destruction is not presented in defense of an enemy. It is broadcast as a warning that what happened to the people of Hiroshima a year ago could next happen anywhere.” As Saudek noted in a letter written to the *New Yorker* editors after the broadcasts, “[T]his simple reading of a text for four successive nights” was “a rather bold experiment in broadcast technique.” In fact, the ABC Hersey reading received the highest rating a public interest radio broadcast had yet received. Clearly, Americans had tuned in. The following spring, ABC and Saudek received a Peabody Award for this bold experiment.

**Consequences**

Although radio was a transformative medium that circulated ideas more widely and with greater speed than print media, print held a higher cultural status than radio at the time “Hiroshima” was published. In a pioneering study on American radio published in 1940, Paul Lazarsfeld found that radio had not displaced newspaper and magazine reading but had actually stimulated such reading: “Print is the lever, we have come to feel, that can move the world.” The emergence and growth of radio broadcasting thus occurred in what Michael Stamm has called “a vibrant reading culture.”

One consequence of that higher cultural status for print is that in the months following the publication of “Hiroshima,” two articles defending the U.S. decision to drop the bomb appeared in influential American magazines,
one in the *Atlantic Monthly* by the president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and one in *Harper’s* by former secretary of war Henry Stimson.\(^8^4\) These articles presented what became the orthodox explanation for the U.S. decision to use the atomic bombs against Japan: the bombs were used to force the Japanese surrender earlier rather than later and thus avoid the loss of perhaps a million American lives in an invasion of Japan. These articles appear to have been written, at least in part, as a response to Hersey’s article and what some officials viewed as a growing public questioning of the wisdom of U.S. actions in response to Hersey’s story.\(^8^5\) Historians have suggested that the Stimson article in particular presented such a powerful case for the necessity of the bombing that it silenced questions the Hersey narrative had raised for many Americans about the morality of dropping the bomb.\(^8^6\)

Still, there were far-reaching repercussions from the “Hiroshima” media event. In the years following the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, anxieties about atomic warfare and emerging Cold War sensibilities penetrated and shaped the American national consciousness. A broad array of Americans—including ordinary citizens, writers, editors, journalists, publishers, media producers, scientists, intellectuals, religious leaders, and policy makers in the highest levels of government—documented, discussed, and sometimes questioned their nation’s use of atomic warfare against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. National communication networks conveyed the information shaping this conversation. One voice in that conversation was clearly Hersey’s *New Yorker* article. Another part of that conversation was radio’s response in broadcasting to millions Hersey’s and the *New Yorker’s* accomplishment.

**CONCLUSION**

From the standpoint of scholarly inquiry, one lesson to draw from this examination of the relationship between print and broadcast is that historians must develop new conceptual approaches to understand how competing or conflicting narratives interact with each other in overlapping circuits of communication with readers moving in and out of different circuits across time. To what degree did readers and listeners of “Hiroshima” in print and radio also read the Stimson article, for example? How did commentary about these various texts inform readers’ and listeners’ understanding? How did readers craft meaning out of multiple texts derived from multiple media forms, and with what effects for readers as individuals and citizens of a nation and the world? These are the kinds of challenging questions that historians of journalism and print culture must begin to ask and to answer as we seek to understand how different media cultures shaped our world.
What we can detect is that in 1946 the American media landscape was deeply structured by print culture. But when the *New Yorker* published “Hiroshima” in 1946, radio interacted with this reading culture to publicize, republish, and provide commentary on what came to be known in America as the most important work of journalism of the twentieth century. John Hersey’s “Hiroshima” gained not only millions of readers but also millions of listeners. And the national conversation about the problems of the atomic age—and possible solutions—expanded.

American readers and radio listeners did not mobilize in large numbers against a potential oncoming nuclear threat after exposure to “Hiroshima,” nor did they challenge in significant numbers their country’s decision to use the bomb. Yet they used “Hiroshima” to inform a robust national conversation about the moral, political, and psychological problems posed by the development and use of atomic weapons. “Hiroshima” dramatized more fully than any previous account known to Americans at the time what the atomic bomb had done and could do to a human community. Those who discussed “Hiroshima” over the airwaves demonstrated a civic courage one rarely sees today in a period when broadcast (and print) are focused on the bottom line, and broadcasting’s requirements for public interest commentary have been significantly reduced. It is impossible to measure what has been lost as American media have retrenched and new technology has fractured the audience for news, but a national conversation of the scale and import that “Hiroshima” inspired seems all but impossible in the contemporary moment.

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**Notes**


8. Robert Darnton, “What Is the History of Books?” in *Reading in America: Literature & Social History*, Cathy Davidson, ed., 27-52 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 30. Originally published in *Daedalus* 111, no. 3 (Summer 1982). The “communications circuit” represents the “life cycle” of a printed book or text. The cycle begins with authors and publishers; moves on to printers, shippers, reviewers, and booksellers; shifts to the reader; and then circles back to the author.


13. Ibid., 182-84.


24. Albert Einstein to unnamed scientists, September 6, 1946, Box 50, Folder “Hersey, John,” NYR.


27. Ibid., 33, 49, and 200-03.


40. Yagoda, *About Town*, 188.

41. Forde, “Profit and Public Interest,” 564.

42. Harold Ross to Milton Greenstein, August 1, 1946, Box 50, Folder “Hersey, John,” NYR.

43. Milton Greenstein to Harold Ross, August 12, 1946 (emphasis in original), Box 50, Folder “Hersey, John,” NYR.


46. Greenstein to Ross, quoting the Atomic Energy Act (emphasis in original). See also Forde, “Profit and Public Interest,” for an account of Greenstein’s counsel about whether the magazine should submit “Hiroshima” to censorship.

47. *New Yorker* Press Release on “Hiroshima,” 28 August 1946, Box 50, Folder “Hersey, John,” NYR.


49. Two famous examples are Dwight Macdonald’s commentary in his leftist journal *Politics* and Mary McCarthy’s response in a later issue of the same journal. Dwight Macdonald, “Hersey’s ‘Hiroshima,’” *Politics*, October 1946, 8, and Mary McCarthy, “The Hiroshima ‘New Yorker,’” *Politics*, November 1946, 367.

50. Letter to *New Yorker* editors from Verner W. Clapp, Director, Acquisitions Department, Library of Congress, 3 September 1946, Box 21, Folder 9, JHP.


54. John Leonard to Harold Ross, 4 September 1946, enclosing script of “This Is New York” program broadcast on WABC (New York) 30 August 1946, Box 50, Folder “Hersey, John,” NYR.

55. Ibid.


58. “A Survey of Radio Comment,” NYR. 190 stations carried this broadcast.

60. “Murrow’s Boys” was the group of journalists recruited to the CBS radio network by Edward R. Murrow. Together, Murrow and his colleagues produced some of the most distinguished American broadcast reporting of World War II. They were very popular among American listening audiences. See Lynne Olson and Stanley W. Cloud, *The Murrow Boys: Pioneers on the Front Lines of Broadcast Journalism* (Boston: Mariner Books, 1996).

64. 135 ABC stations carried the Agronsky broadcast.
65. 150 ABC stations carried the Baukhage broadcast.
67. Ibid, 169.

69. 135 ABC stations carried the Swing broadcast.
74. Ibid.
77. “Newspapers in Which Hiroshima Has Been or Is Being Reprinted,” internal *New Yorker* report, 23 October 1946, Box 1076, Folder “Hiroshima-Master List,” NYR.
79. Ibid., 80.
available at Paley Center for Media, Beverly Hills.

81. Robert Saudek to R. Hawley Truax, 3 September 1946, Box 1077, Folder “Hiroshima Radio,” NYR.


85. Corey, The World through a Monocle, 36.


87. Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light, 209-10.